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Abstract
An important scheduling problem is the one in which
there are no dependencies between tasks and the tasks can
be of arbitrary size. This is known as the divisible load
scheduling problem and was studied extensively in recent
years resulting in a cohesive theory called Divisible Load
Theory (DLT). In this paper we augment the existing di-
visible load theory with incentives. We develop a strate-
gyproof mechanism for scheduling divisible loads in dis-
tributed systems assuming a bus type interconnection and
a linear cost model for the processors. The mechanism pro-
vides incentives to processors such that it is beneﬁcial for
them to report their true processing power and process the
assigned load using their full processing capacity. We de-
ﬁne the strategyproof mechanism and prove its properties.
We simulateandstudytheimplementationofthemechanism
on systems characterized by different parameters.
1. Introduction
Scheduling tasks in a distributed computing system is
one of the most challengingproblemsthat need to be solved
when running applications. By efﬁciently scheduling the
tasks the performance and the efﬁciency of the system is
improved. The task scheduling problem takes many forms
depending on the characteristics of the tasks to be sched-
uled,thecharacteristicsofthemachinescomprisingthe sys-
tem and the objective function that needs to be optimized.
One type of scheduling problem is the one in which there
are no dependencies between tasks and the tasks can be of
arbitrary size. This is the case for several applications in
science and engineering in which the total load can be split
into an arbitrary number of independent loads. These loads
require the same type of processing and can be assigned
to any computer in the system. In practice it corresponds to
thewidelyusedmaster-slavemodelofparallelcomputation.
The above scheduling problem can be characterized using
the divisible load model which was studied extensively in
recent years resulting in a cohesive theory called Divisible
Load Theory (DLT). Divisible load theory provides analyt-
ical results and optimal algorithms for scheduling loads on
various types of platforms such as bus, tree, star and linear
networks [5].
The scheduling algorithms developed within DLT as-
sume that the participants (in this case, processors) are obe-
dient. Thus, they report to the scheduler the true param-
eters of their processing facilities (e.g. processing power).
The scheduler makes the allocation decision according to
the values reported by the processors or by the owners of
these processors. This assumption is not valid in real life
situations where these participants have no a-priori motiva-
tion for cooperation and they are tempted to manipulate the
scheduling algorithm if it is beneﬁcial to do so. This behav-
ior may lead to poor system performance and inefﬁciency.
Thus, we need to developnew algorithmsandprotocolsthat
address the self interest of the participants. Unlike the tra-
ditional DLT algorithms, the new protocols must deal with
the possible manipulations. Also, the system must provide
incentives to agents to participate in the given algorithm.
The solution of these kinds of problems comes from eco-
nomics,morepreciselyfrommechanismdesigntheory[18].
The scope of this theory is to provide tools and methods to
design protocols for self interested agents. Of interest are
the so called strategyproof mechanisms in which the partic-
ipants maximize their own utilities only if they report their
trueparametersandfollow thegivenalgorithm. In a general
mechanism each participant has a privately known function
called valuationwhich quantiﬁesthe agent’s beneﬁt or loss.
Paymentsare designedandused to motivatethe participants
to report their true valuations. The goal of each participant
is to maximize the sum of her valuation and payment. As
an example consider several resource providers that offercomputerservices. We assume that each resource is charac-
terized by its job processing rate. An allocation mechanism
is strategyproof if a resource owner maximizes her utility
only by reporting the true resource processing rate to the
mechanism. The optimal utility is independent of the val-
ues reported by the other participating processors.
In this paper we consider the design of strategyproof
scheduling mechanisms in the context of divisible load the-
ory. To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst attempt to augment
DLT with incentives. We develop a strategyproof mecha-
nismthatprovidesincentivestothe processorstoparticipate
andreporttheirtrueprocessingcapabilitiesto thescheduler.
The processors gain the maximum proﬁt by executing the
task only if they are truthfully reporting the private values
characterizing their processing capabilities.
Related work. The divisible load scheduling problem was
studied extensively in recent years resulting in a cohesive
theory called Divisible Load Theory. A reference book on
DLT is [5]. Two recent surveys on DLT are [6] and [19].
This theory has been used for scheduling loads on hetero-
geneous distributed systems in the context of different ap-
plications such as image processing [13], databases [7], lin-
ear algebra [8], and multimedia broadcasting [4]. Schedul-
ing divisible loads in grids has been investigated in [22].
New results and open research problems in DLT are pre-
sented in [3]. All these works assumed that the participants
in the load scheduling algorithms are obedient and follow
the algorithm. Recently, several researchers considered the
mechanism design theory to solve several computational
problems that involve self interested participants. These
problems include resource allocation and task scheduling
[16, 20, 21], routing [9] and multicast transmission [10]. In
their seminal paper, Nisan and Ronen [17] considered for
the ﬁrst time the mechanism design problem in a computa-
tional setting. They proposed and studied a VCG(Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves) type mechanism for the shortest path in
graphs where edges belong to self interested agents. They
also provided a mechanism for solving the task schedul-
ing on unrelated machines problem. A general framework
for designing strategyproof mechanisms for one parameter
agent was proposed by Archer and Tardos [1]. They de-
veloped a general method to design strategyproof mecha-
nisms for optimization problems that have general objec-
tive functionsand restricted form for valuations. In a subse-
quent paper [2] the same authors investigated the frugality
of shortest path mechanisms. Grosu and Chronopoulos[12]
derivedastrategyproofmechanismthatgivestheoverallop-
timal solution for the static load balancing problem in dis-
tributed systems. The results and the challenges of design-
ing distributed mechanisms are surveyed in [11]. The strat-
egyproof computing paradigm proposed in [14] considers
the self-interest and incentives of participants in distributed
computing systems. Ng et al. [15] proposed a strategyproof
system for dynamic resource allocation in data staging.
Our contributions. The main contribution of this paper is to
show how existing divisible load theory can be augmented
with incentives. We develop a strategyproof mechanism for
schedulingdivisibleloadsin distributedsystems assuminga
bustypeinterconnectionanda linearcostmodelforthepro-
cessors. We deﬁne the mechanism and prove its properties.
We simulate and study the implementation of the mecha-
nism on systems characterized by different parameters.
Organization. Thepaperisstructured as follows. In Section
2 we present a description of the divisible load scheduling
problem. In Section 3 we presentthe frameworkused to de-
sign our mechanism. In Section 4 we present and discuss
the proposed strategyproof mechanism. In Section 5 we
study by simulation the proposed scheduling mechanism.
In Section 6 we draw conclusions and present future direc-
tions.
2. Divisible Load Scheduling Problem
We consider a distributed system with a bus intercon-
nection and a master processor. The set of processors is
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￿ is the time to communicate a unit
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master has no processing capability and it can communi-
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In Fig. 1 we present a diagram showing the execution on
this system.
The scheduling problem denoted as BUS-LINEAR is
to determine the load allocation
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The BUS-LINEAR problem can be formally described as
follows:
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Figure 1. Timing diagram for the load execu-
tion.
subject to the constraints:
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The following theorems proved in [5] characterize the
optimal solution.
Theorem 2.1. The optimal solution for the BUS-LINEAR
problem is obtained when all processors participate and
they all ﬁnish executing their assigned load at the same
time, i.e.
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Theorem 2.2. Any load allocation order is optimal for the
BUS-LINEAR problem.
The following algorithm solves the BUS-LINEAR prob-
lem:
BUS-LINEAR Algorithm
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The algorithm is executed by the master processor
￿
￿ when
a new load needs to be processed. In order to compute the
allocation
￿
￿ requires information about the network and
about the processing capabilities. The processors are as-
sumed to reporttheir true processingtimes for one unitload
to the master. This may not happen if the processors are
owned and managed by different entities or agents. They
may report different values in order to gain proﬁt. In the
next sections we present the design of a mechanism that
gives incentive to the agents to report their true processing
capabilities.
3. Mechanism Design Framework
In this section we introducethe main conceptsof mecha-
nism design theory. We limit our description to mechanism
design problems for one parameter agents. In this type of
mechanism design problems each agent has some private
data represented by a single real valued parameter [17]. In
the following we deﬁne such problem.
A mechanism design problem for one parameter agents
is characterized by:
(i) A ﬁnite set
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Deﬁnition 3.1. (Mechanism) A mechanism with veriﬁca-
tion is characterized by two functions:
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Notation: In the rest of the paper we denote by
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￿ the
vector of bids not including the bid of agent
￿. The vector
￿
is represented as
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￿.Deﬁnition 3.2. (Strategyproof mechanism) A mechanism
is called strategyproof if for every agent
￿ of type
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￿ and
for every bids
￿
￿
￿ of the other agents, the agent’s utility is
maximized when she declares her real type
￿
￿ (i.e. truth-
telling is a dominant strategy).
A desirable property of a mechanism is that the utility of
a truthfulagentis always non-negative. The agentshope for
a proﬁt by participating in the mechanism.
Deﬁnition 3.3. (Voluntary participation mechanism) We
say that a mechanism satisﬁes the voluntary participation
condition if
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4. The proposed mechanism
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nism is characterized by the true value
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process a unit load). The processors may not report the
true value. After all the processors report their values the
mechanism computes an output function (i.e. the loads as-
signed to computers),
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the makespan is minimized. A processor
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process the load allocated to it at a different processing rate
given by its execution value
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￿. Thus,
processor
￿
￿ may process the assigned load at a slower rate
than its true processing rate. The goal of a strategyproof
mechanism with veriﬁcation is to give incentives to agents
such that it is beneﬁcial for them to report their true val-
ues and process the assigned loads using their full process-
ing capacity. After the loads are processed, the execution
value
￿
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￿ for everyprocessor
￿
￿ is knownto the mechanism.
Once the mechanism knows the execution values it com-
putes and hands a payment
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￿ to each processor
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￿.
All processors know the mechanism and the algorithm used
to compute the output function (allocation). We assume an
arbitraryorderontheset ofprocessors,whichwill notaffect
the optimality of allocation (according to Theorem 2.2).
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which is equivalent to the negation of
￿
￿’s actual time re-
quired to process load
￿
￿. The greater the processing time,
the smaller the valuation. This can be considered to be the
cost incurred by
￿
￿ in processing
￿
￿. We assume that each
processor wants to choose its strategy (what value
￿
￿ to re-
port) such that its utility is maximized. The utility for each
processorisdeﬁnedasthepaymentreceivedfromthemech-
anism plus the valuationdeterminedby the load allocatedto
it:
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The goal is to design a strategyproof mechanism that mini-
mizes the makespan of the system composed of the
￿ pro-
cessors. This involves ﬁnding an allocation algorithm and
a payment scheme that minimizes the makespan according
to the processors’ bids
￿ and motivates all the processors
to bid their true values
￿
￿ and process the load at their full
processing capacity (i.e.
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￿). For our mechanism we
use the optimal allocation algorithm described in Section 2.
Using this algorithm and the method presented in [17] we
designed a strategyproof mechanism with veriﬁcation that
minimizes the makespan. In the following we deﬁne the
mechanism.
Deﬁnition 4.1. (DLS-BL Mechanism) The DLS-BL mech-
anism is deﬁned by the following two functions:
(i) The allocationfunctiongivenby the BUS-LINEAR al-
gorithm.
(ii) The payment function given by:
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ecution time when processor
￿
￿ is not used in the allo-
cation. Thus, the bonus for a processor is equal to its
contribution in reducing the total execution time.
For our scheduling mechanism we can state the follow-
ing theorems.
Theorem 4.1. (Strategyproofness) The DLS-BL mecha-
nism is strategyproof.
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We consider two possible situations:
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￿ processes its assigned load
using its full processing capability.
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If processor
￿
￿ bidslower (
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿) then its utility
￿
￿
￿ is:
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (10)
We want to show that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, which reduces to
show that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Because
￿
￿
￿ is the minimum possible
value for the processing time (from the optimality of BUS-
LINEAR algorithm), by bidding a lower value, processor
￿
￿ gets more load and the total execution time is increased,
thus
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
If processor
￿
￿ bids higher (
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿) then its utility
￿
￿
￿
is:
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (11)
By bidding a higher value processor
￿
￿ gets less load
and thus more load will be assigned to the other processors.
Due to the optimality of allocation the total execution time
increases i.e.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and thus we have
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
(ii)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ i.e. processor
￿
￿ processes its assigned load
at a slower rate thus increasing the total execution time. A
similar argument as in case i) applies.
A desirable property of a mechanism is that the proﬁt
of a truthful agent is always non-negative. This means the
agents hope for a proﬁt by participating in the mechanism.
Theorem 4.2. (Voluntary participation) The DLS-BL
mechanism satisﬁes the voluntary participation condition.
Proof. The utility of processor
￿
￿ when it bids its true value
￿
￿ is:
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (12)
The total execution time
￿
￿
￿ is obtained by using all the
other processors except processor
￿. By allocating the same
amount of load, we get a higher execution time
￿
￿
￿ than
in the case of using all the processors, with processor
￿
￿
bidding its true value (from the optimality of allocation).
Thus
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
We obtained a strategyproof scheduling mechanism that
satisﬁes the voluntary participation condition. Because the
optimalalgorithmassumesacentraldispatcher(master),the
mechanismwill beimplementedinacentralizedwayaspart
of the master’s code. The protocolassumes the existence of
a payment infrastructure. In the following we present the
protocol that implements the DLS-BL mechanism.
Protocol DLS-BL:
1. After the master processor
￿
￿ collects all the
bids it computes the allocation using the BUS-
LINEAR algorithm.
2. Once the assigned load is ﬁnished the Master
processor
￿
￿ does the following:
2.1. Determines the execution values for each
processor,
￿
￿
￿.
2.2. Computes the payments
￿
￿ for each proces-
sor
￿
￿ using equation (7).
2.3. Sends
￿
￿ to each
￿
￿.
3. Each processor receives its payment and evalu-
ates its proﬁt.
Processors will obtain the maximum proﬁt only when
they report the true value of their processing time.
5. Experimental results
In this section we study by simulation the pro-
posed strategyproof scheduling mechanism. We consider
two distributed systems composed of sixteen processors
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿) and one master processor (
￿
￿). The ﬁrst sys-
tem, called the ‘fast’ system, has a fast
￿
￿ with
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
The second system, called the ‘slow’ system, has a slow
￿
￿ with
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿. The times to process a unit load
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ are presented in Table 1. For both systems
we assume that only
￿
￿ cheats by reporting values different
than its true processing time and by processing the load at
a different rate than the true rate. The time to communicate
a unit load from
￿
￿ to any other processor is
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for
both systems. The low communication latency ensures that
the system iscomputationallybound. If
￿ isequalin magni-
tude or larger than the time to process a unit load at the fast
processors, the system becomes communication bound, re-
sulting in fewer processors performing work and negligible
bonuses.
For each system, we examine eight cases:
(1)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (i.e.,
￿
￿ bids truthfully and it processes
the load as reported);
(2)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (i.e.,
￿
￿ bids truthfully, but processes
the load at a slower rate);
(3)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (i.e.,
￿
￿ bids a rate slower than its true
rate, but processes the load at the reported rate);
(4)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (i.e.,
￿
￿ bids a rate slower than its true
rate, but it processes the load at its true rate);(5)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (i.e.,
￿
￿ processes its load slower than
its true rate and bids a rate slower than its execution
rate);
(6)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (i.e.,
￿
￿ processes the load slower than
it bid and bids a rate slower than its true rate);
(7)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (i.e.,
￿
￿ bids a rate faster than its true
rate, but processes the load at its true rate);
(8)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (i.e.,
￿
￿ bids a rate faster than its true
rate and processes the load slower than its true rate).
The bid
￿
￿ and the execution value
￿
￿
￿ for each case are
presented in Table 2 (fast system) and Table 3 (slow sys-
tem).
Figure 2 and 3 show the makespan (
￿) for the eight
cases and the two types of systems, fast and slow. No-
t i c et h a tc a s e( 1 )(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿) results in the minimum
makespan, while all other cases result in larger makespan.
When
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (cases (3), (4), and (5)), the makespan is
increased by a small amount (
￿
￿
￿
￿ for the slow system and
￿
￿
￿ for the fast system) as the load allocated to
￿
￿ is re-
duced and the load allocated to the other processors is in-
creased. The impact is larger if the number of processors
is reduced as there are fewer processors to distribute the
load. In the remaining cases (
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿), the system perfor-
mance dramatically degrades as
￿
￿ is overloaded and the
other processors are underutilized. In these cases,
￿
￿ is the
processor which is slowing down the entire system. The in-
crease in makespan is large (between
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿)a n d
it is due to the impact of
￿
￿
￿. Comparing the fast system
Table 1. The times to process a unit load.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ –
￿
￿
￿
￿ –
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ –
￿
￿
￿
fast slow
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Table 2. Bids and execution values (fast sys-
tem).
Case 123456 7 8
￿
￿ 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.05 0.05
￿
￿
￿ 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2
Table 3. Bids and execution values (slow sys-
tem).
Case 12345678
￿
￿ 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.5
￿
￿
￿ 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.8
 0.02
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 0.04
 0.05
 0.06
 0.07
 0.08
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8
T
Case
Figure 2. Makespan when
￿
￿ cheats (fast sys-
tem).
 0.03
 0.035
 0.04
 0.045
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8
T
Case
Figure 3. Makespan when
￿
￿ cheats (slow
system).
with the slow system, we noticethatthe performancedegra-
dation is greater for the fast system even though the rela-
tive rate change is similar or smaller than that for the slow
system. This is because BUS-LINEAR algorithm allocates
more work to faster processors than to slower processors.
The relationship between
￿
￿’s utility and payment ver-
sus the eight cases for the fast and slow system is depicted
in Figure 4 and Figure 5 respectively. As expected, case (1)
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿) results in the greatest
￿
￿ which means
that when
￿
￿ is not cheating it gets the maximum utility. In
all the other cases
￿
￿ obtains a lower
￿
￿.W h e n
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(cases (2), (6), (7), and (8)), the utility is negativedue to the
impact of
￿
￿
￿ on the makespan. In these cases,
￿
￿
￿
￿ as
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.I nt h er e m a i n --0.05
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Q1
U1
Figure 4. Payment and Utility of
￿
￿ (fast sys-
tem).
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Figure 5. Payment and Utility of
￿
￿ (slow sys-
tem).
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Figure 6. Utility of each processor when
￿
￿
cheats (fast system).
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Figure 7. Utility of each processor when
￿
￿
cheats (slow system).
ing cases,
￿
￿ and thus
￿
￿ is reduced as
￿
￿ is smaller than
in the optimal case. As anticipated, the utility of
￿
￿ is much
greater for the fast system than for the slow system, due to
larger allocations to faster processors.
Figure 6 and 7 show the utility for all processors and all
cases for the two types of systems we considered. When
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (cases (3), (4), (5), and (6)),
￿
￿ (for
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿)
is increased resulting in greater
￿
￿. For example
￿
￿ is in-
creased by
￿
￿
￿ in the fast system and by
￿
￿ in the slow
system. When
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (cases (7) and (8)), the reduced
￿
￿
results in decreased
￿
￿. For example
￿
￿ is decreased by
￿
￿
￿ in the fast system and by
￿
￿ in the slow system. In
the remaining cases,
￿
￿ and
￿
￿ are unchanged as
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
The impact of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is felt unevenly among the proces-
sors. The effects of cheating diminishes as the processor
index increases. For example in the case of the fast system
and cases (3), (4), (5), and (6), the increase in
￿
￿ is
￿
￿
￿
while the increase in
￿
￿
￿ is
￿
￿
￿. This behavior is due to
the allocation computed by the scheduling algorithm.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we considered the design of strategyproof
scheduling mechanisms in the context of divisible load the-
ory. To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst attempt to augment
DLT with incentives. We developeda strategyproofmecha-
nismthatprovidesincentivesto theprocessorstoparticipate
andreporttheirtrueprocessingcapabilitiesto thescheduler.
The processors gain the maximum proﬁt by executing the
load only if they are truthfully reporting their private values
characterizing their processing capabilities. We proved and
studied the properties of the mechanism. We performed an
extensive simulation study in order to show the properties
of our mechanism. Future work include the developmentof distributed mechanisms for task scheduling and also the
study of agents’ privacy in these mechanisms.
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